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Case No. 20150123-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff! Appellant, 
V. 
ROBBIE MICHAEL MACDONALD, 
Oefendant/Appellee. 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court granted the State's petition for interlocutory review of 
two pretrial rulings. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Annotated§ 78A-3-102(3)(h) (West 2009). 
INTRODUCTION 1 
Eleven-month-old Gabriel suffered severe brain damage. Defendant 
Robbie MacDonald, the only adult home with the baby when he was 
injured, has been charged with second degree felony child abuse and 
obstruction of justice. It is anticipated that MacDonald's defense at trial will 
1Because MacDonald has not yet been tried, he retains the 
presumption of innocence. The facts alleged here and in the Statement of 
Facts are drawn from sworn testimony given at several pretrial evidentiary 
hearings. 
be that the baby was injured in an accidental fall, rather than by an 
intentional act. 
The State appeals two pretrial rulings. In the first, the trial court 
suppressed two of three police interviews in which MacDonald gave 
conflicting accounts about what happened. In the second ruling, the court 
excluded evidence that showed MacDonald's contempt for the baby and 
MacDonald's past physical aggression toward him. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue I(a): MacDonald was interviewed by police twice within five 
days. In both interviews, MacDonald came to the police station voluntarily, 
was unrestrained while speaking with unarmed plain-clothes detectives in 
an unlocked room, and was allowed to leave afterward. 
Did the trial court err when it concluded that MacDonald was not in 
custody during these interviews? 
Issue J(b): At the outset of MacDonald's first interview, officers read 
him his Miranda rights and MacDonald confirmed that he understood them. 
At the beginning of the second interview, MacDonald acknowledged that 
he received the Miranda warnings before the earlier interview. 
Did the h·ial court err when it concluded that MacDonald did not 
explicitly or impliedly waive his Miranda rights? 
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Standard of Review: Whether an interrogation is custodial is reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Butt, 2012 UT 34, if 7, 284 P.3d 605. Whether a 
defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights is a mixed question; the 
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness. See State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, if 32, 322 P.3d 
624. 
Preservation: R 944-45, 979, 1201 :27-39, 1202:44-52. 
Issue II: The State moved under rule 404(b) to admit evidence that 
MacDonald hated the baby and both verbally and physically abused him in 
the weeks before he was injured. The trial court denied the motion. 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it ruled that the evidence 
was inadmissible under rule 404(b)? 
Standard of Review: A h·ial court's rule 404(b) ruling is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. See State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, if 11, 328 P.3d 841. 
Preservation: R953-61, 1066-68. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
MacDonald repeatedly taunts and physically abuses his 
girlfriend's 11-month-old baby 
MacDonald began dating Addie L. in June 2013. They moved in 
together in early December 2013, along with MacDonald's 3-year-old 
daughter, K.M., and Addie's 11-month-old baby, G.B. R1196:53-54. 
Addie soon noticed that MacDonald had "a severe amount of 
jealousy" toward her baby. R1198:9. MacDonald told Addie that her baby 
was too "possessive" of her. Id. MacDonald would h7 to keep G.B. "away 
from" Addie whenever he tried to follow her around their basement 
apartment. Id.; 1205:52. 
MacDonald thought that the baby "had an attitude towards him" and 
"didn't like him." R1198:9, 11. And MacDonald made it clear to Addie that 
he didn't like her baby either. MacDonald sometimes complained that the 
baby "just look[ed] at him with big stupid eyes." R1198:11. MacDonald 
told Addie that he thought the baby was "dumb" and called hhn a 
"whiner" "throughout" their time together. R1198:11; 1205:56. On several 
occasions, MacDonald even made fun of the baby's penis size. R1205:19. 
MacDonald often com1nented negatively on G.B.'s race. R1198:11. 
The baby's father was Guatemalan, but MacDonald called him Addie's 
"little Mexican." R1205:45. MacDonald called the baby a "spic" several 
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times, and he once told Addie that G.B. "didn't fit in our family because he's 
brown." R1205:40, 42. One day, when Addie and MacDonald passed a 
h·ailer park, MacDonald told Addie that the baby "would fit in there 
because it's full of spies, but the rest of us wouldn't." R1205:43. MacDonald 
said that he thought the baby's eyes were not" straight/' and he complained 
that with "Hispanic babies," "their eyes are never straight." R1198:11-12. 
MacDonald often yelled at the baby. R1198:12. Once in mid-January 
2013, MacDonald flipped him off "with both hands" while shooting him "a 
very mean look." R1205:46. And if MacDonald saw his daughter pushing 
the baby, he wouldn't stop her. R1205:12. 
MacDonald repeatedly told Addie that he "did not like to be 
touched" by her baby. And while MacDonald sometimes let his daughter 
onto their bed, he wouldn't let G.B. onto their bed-even if it n1eant that 
Addie had to breastfeed her baby while lying on the floor. R1205:10, 27-28, 
59. 
MacDonald sometimes treated G.B. roughly. Twice, MacDonald 
stopped G. B. from following his mother around their apartment by 
grabbing him "by the arm" and dropping "him in a beanbag chair rather 
forcefully." Rl 198:10; 1205:22. Both times, Addie thought this hurt her 
baby. Id. 
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In early January 2013, G.B. came down with the flu. R1109:16. 
Around January 10 or 11, Addie asked MacDonald to give G.B. medicine 
orally through a syringe. Id.; 1205:31, 36. The next day, Addie noticed 
bruises on the baby's jaw. R1109:16. It "looked like somebody had 
squished his face to get him to open his mouth." R1109:17. When Addie 
asked MacDonald about it, he denied hurting the baby and said that he 
must have gotten hurt falling over. R1205:35. 
The baby suffers traumatic brain injury 
while left alone in MacDonald's care 
Addie and MacDonald lived in a two-bedroom, partially finished 
basement aparhnent in American Fork. R1196:57. The bedroom that K.M. 
and G.B. shared did not have carpet, but it did have a "double layer" of 
"fairly ncv/' and "pretty soft" rugs. Rl 196:58. Because of the way the rugs 
overlapped, a s1nall strip of exposed concrete ran "about a foot along the 
wall." Id. 
After MacDonald flipped the baby off, Addie began thinking about 
moving out. R1205:47-48. On the morning of January 18, 2013, MacDonald 
promised Addie that he would start being a "good dad" to both children. 
R1205:48. Addie said that he could "prove it" by watching both children 
that day while she was at work. Id. She told him: "This is your chance." 
R1205:50. 
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Later that afternoon, MacDonald called Addie at work to tell her that 
the baby was not breathing and that their upstairs roommate had called an 
a1nbulance. R1196:60. Addie met them at the local hospital, where her baby 
was "barely hanging onto life." Id. The baby was later transferred to 
Primary Children's Hospital. Id. 
Dr. Christine Campbell, a pediatrician at Primary Children's Hospital 
specializing in suspected child abuse cases, was brought in to consult on 
G.B.'s case the day after he arrived. R1196:5-6. By then, G.B. was in the 
intensive care unit. R1196:8. He was "not breathing on his own" and was 
on a" particular type of ventilator" used in the "most critically ill children." 
Id. G.B. had lung damage, was not responsive, and needed medication to 
support his heart rate and blood pressure. Id. 
Dr. Campbell found "subdural bleeding" in G.B.'s brain-a particular 
type of bleeding "associated with very high energy, stopping and starting" 
of the brain inside the skull, and which is commonly associated with cases 
of "abusive head h·auma" or "shaken baby syndrome." R1196:13. She also 
found "retinal hemorrhages" and "retinal folds" -two types of "very severe 
damage" to the back of the eyes that happen only with "massive head 
trauma." R1196:13, 16. G.B. spent a month in the hospital and has been in 
intensive therapy ever since. Rl 196:62, 64. Though he has improved 
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somewhat, he will most likely be permanently blind and have some degree 
of lasting brain damage. R1196:17. 
MacDonald's first interview 
G.B. was injured on the afternoon of January 18, 2013. Later that day, 
Detective Ryan Metcalf drove MacDonald to the police station for an 
interview. R1151. The door to the interview room was closed but not 
locked, MacDonald was not restrained, and MacDonald had a water bottle 
with him the entire time. R1151; see also State's Exh. 3.2 Detective Metcalf 
was not armed, nor was he wearing a uniform. See id. 
When the interview began, Detective Metcalf thought to himself that 
it "was not likely" that MacDonald would be charged with any crime 
stemming from G.B.'s injuries. R1201:9. Detective Metcalf nevertheless told 
MacDonald: 
Before we begin chatting, I just want to let you know, we've, 
this is kind preliminary, we do this with everybody, ok, we 
just want everyone to know, and you've probably heard this 
on TV, your rights, ok? I'm not sure if you particularly need 
these rights because we're just kind of asking what's going on 
with [G.B.]. But I just wanted to get that out of the way, ok. 
State's Exh. 3 at 4:30-5:02. 
2 DVD's containing recordings of MacDonald's police interviews were 
admitted as exhibits at an evidentiary hearing below and are included 
together in the record in a folder labeled R1207. 
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Detective Metcalf then advised MacDonald of each of his Miranda 
rights. Id. at 5:02-5:24. Detective Metcalf then asked: "Do you understand 
those rights?" MacDonald answered, "yes." Id. at 5:24. 
Detective Metcalf asked MacDonald to explain what happened the 
day that G.B. was injured. MacDonald told him that sometime after Addie 
left for work, G.B. fell asleep on the floor while watching TV. Id. at 11:48-
12:32. MacDonald said that he picked the baby up and put him in his crib, 
but that when he returned to check on the baby about a half hour later, the 
baby was unresponsive and not breathing. Id. at 12:32-13:10, 15:00-37. 
Detective Metcalf asked if the baby had slipped or fallen or "hit his head on 
something" before being put to bed; MacDonald said that he had not. Id. at 
21:28-32. 
The interview lasted one hour and four minutes. Id. at 4:30-1:08:00. 
At the end, Detective Metcalf offered to drive MacDonald home or to let 
him leave with a friend who was also there being interviewed. Id. at 1:08:19. 
MacDonald said he was fine "either way." Id. 
MacDonald's second interview 
Five days after the initial interview, on January 23, 2013, Detective 
Gregg Ludlow called MacDonald on the phone and asked him to cmne to 
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the police station for another interview. R1201:13. MacDonald's 
grandfather drove him to the police station and waited for him there. Id. 
This time, MacDonald was interviewed by detectives Ludlow and 
Liddiard, both of whom were in plain clothes and unarmed. R1201:13; see 
also State's Exh. 4. MacDonald was again unrestrained, the door to the room 
was closed but not locked, and the interview was recorded. See State's Exh. 
4; Rl 148. MacDonald had his cell phone in his pocket throughout the 
interview. State's Exh. 4 at 1:12:10. 
At the outset, Detective Ludlow said: "I know you talked with, was it 
Detective Metcalf the other day?" Id. at 0:50. MacDonald responded 
affirmatively. Id. Detective Ludlow then reminded MacDonald: "When he 
brought you in, he talked to you about your rights and all that stuff? You 
remember all that stuff, right?" Id. MacDonald responded affirmatively by 
repeatedly nodding his head. See id. 
Detective Ludlow then asked MacDonald to tell the1n what happened 
on the day that G.B. was hurt. Id. at 1:25. MacDonald initially repeated the 
story he had told before- that after the baby fell asleep on the floor, 
MacDonald put him in his crib without incident, only to find him a half 
hour later not breathing. Id. at 2:59-4:50. 
-10-
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But Detective Ludlow told MacDonald that medical tests showed that 
G.B. had "suffered trauma" of some sort and suggested that MacDonald's 
story was not accurate. Id. at 6:20-7:10. Detective Ludlow told MacDonald 
that he did not "have any intentions of running you down to jail tonight," 
and then asked MacDonald to "come clean" and explain "what happen.ed 
with that little baby." Id. at 7:10-57. 
After some initial hesitation, MacDonald told the detectives that 
when he walked into the room to put the baby in the crib, he tripped on the 
rug and dropped the baby on the floor. Id. at 16:30-35, 18:40. MacDonald 
said that the impact woke the baby up, but that he fell asleep after 
MacDonald held him for about five minutes. Id. at 20:10, 52:12. MacDonald 
then repeated his claim that he first realized the baby was hurt when he 
checked on him a half hour later. Id. MacDonald denied shaking, 
squeezing, or intentionally hurting G.B. Id. at 24:04, 25:50, 33:07. 
Detective Ludlow also asked MacDonald about his relationship with 
the baby. MacDonald insisted that he "loved" G.B.; he denied ever being 
jealous of him or calling him racial epithets. Id. at 31:00-32:12, 42:41. 
MacDonald admitted, however, that he had called G.B. a "whiner" and had 
flipped him off once. Id. at 32:00, 42:26. 
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Toward the end of the interview, Detective Liddiard twice repeated 
that they had "no plan" to take MacDonald "to jail tonight." Id. at 1:09:31, 
1:12:36. An hour and 12 minutes after the interview began, the detectives 
left the room. See State's Exh. 4 at 0:50-1:1:12:41. Detective Ludlow returned 
a little over an hour later and asked MacDonald if he would "mind writing 
down what we talked about." Id. at 2:20:38. MacDonald agreed to do so 
and then filled out a written state1nent on a pre-printed form. See January 
23 Statement.3 
At the top of that form was a printed paragraph that detailed each of 
the Miranda rights and an express waiver of them. Id. MacDonald signed 
imn1ediately below that paragraph. Id. Below this, MacDonald handwrote 
a short statement in which he again claimed that he had accidentally 
dropped G.B. after tripping on the rug. Id. 
After filling out this statement, MacDonald left the police station with 
his grandfather, who had been waiting for him outside. R1201:16. 
MacDonald's third interview 
The next day, on January 24, 2013, Detective Liddiard called 
MacDonald and asked him to co1ne in for another interview. R1201:17. 
3 This written statement is included in the folder marked R1207. Like 
the recording of the first January 18 interview, it is labeled "State's Exhibit 
3." 
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MacDonald's grandfather again drove him to the police station. But this 
time, MacDonald's grandfather decided to go home rather than wait at the 
station. Id. 
This interview, like the previous ones, took place in an unlocked 
romn with the door closed. R1145; State's Exh. 5. Detectives Liddiard and 
Ludlow were again in plain clothes with no visible weapons, and 
MacDonald was unrestrained. State's Exh. 5. 
At the outset, Detective Liddiard told MacDonald that his 
grandfather had decided not to wait at the station, and he asked if 
MacDonald wanted the detectives to drive him home after the interview. 
Id. at 0:38. MacDonald said that would be fine. Id. Detective Liddiard also 
assured MacDonald that officers would not take him to jail that day. Id. at 
0:56. 
Detective Liddiard reminded MacDonald that Officer Metcalf had 
told him about the Miranda rights during the first interview, and that "we 
reminded you yesterday and you were willing to talk to us, and you' re still 
willing to talk to us today? Id. at 0:58-1:48. MacDonald nodded, and 
Detective Liddiard continued: "I want to make sure that he didn't make 
any 1nistake about your Miranda rights, I just want to tell you again, and 
you can just tell us if you' re still willing to talk to us, is that ok. A lot of 
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people laugh at us because they're like, 'well I've heard this on TV so many 
times."' Id. Still nodding, MacDonald replied: "I understand, you have to 
do it." Id. 
Detective Liddiard then informed MacDonald of his Miranda rights, 
after which MacDonald confirmed that he understood those rights and that 
he was "still willing to talk" to the detectives. Id. at 1:48-2:07. 
As the interview began, Detective Liddiard repeated that "no matter 
what" MacDonald told them, the detectives would not arrest him and that 
they would be taking him home. Id. at 10:14. During the interview, 
MacDonald repeated his claim that he accidentally dropped the baby on the 
carpet and did not shake or intentionally harm him. Id. at 10:51-56:53. The 
interview lasted about 57 minutes, after which officers took him home. 
The trial court suppresses the first two interviews 
The State charged MacDonald with one count of child abuse, a second 
degree felony, and one count of obstruction of justice, a third degree felony. 
Rl-4, 1069-70, 1071-73. 
MacDonald moved to suppress only the last two interviews. 
MacDonald argued that (1) officers did not adequately advise him of his 
Miranda rights during the second interview and (2) that the last interview 
should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous h·ee" -i.e., from the failure 
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to Mirandize him in the second interview. R286-93. At argument on 
MacDonald's motion, the trial court questioned whether the first (January 
18) interview should also be suppressed given the lack of an II explicit" 
Miranda waiver. R1201:27-28. 
After further briefing and argument, the trial court issued a written 
ruling suppressing the first two interviews. R1143-52 (Addendum B). The 
court did not suppress the last interview. 
Trial court ruling on the first (January 18) interview: Miranda 
warnings are required only when there is a "custodial interrogation." 
R1143-52; see also State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, if 92, 322 P.3d 624. Here, the trial 
court ruled that MacDonald was in custody in the first interview because he 
"was not free to leave" and the detective's questions were II accusatory." 
R1149-50. Thus, the court concluded that Miranda warnings were required. 
The trial court then concluded that although Detective Metcalf had 
read MacDonald his Miranda rights, MacDonald had not expressly or 
impliedly waived his rights. Id. The court alternatively ruled that even if 
there had been an implied waiver, it was "undermined" when Detective 
Metcalf told MacDonald that he 11 wasn' t sure that [MacDonald] needed his 
rights to be read to him." Id. 
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Trial court ruling on the second (January 23) interview: The trial 
court ruled that MacDonald was in custody for the second interview 
because it was held in a police station with two officers present and their 
questions were" accusatory." R1148-49. 
The trial court reasoned that although the officers "reminded" 
MacDonald that he had been read his Miranda rights five days earlier and 
although MacDonald nodded in response, the lapse of five days made the 
reminder insufficient. Id. Because the court concluded that the second 
Miranda warning was ineffective, it also suppressed the second interview. 
Id. 
Trial court ruling on the third (January 24) interview: The trial court 
did not suppress the January 24 interview because the detectives fully 
informed MacDonald of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interview 
and expressly waived those rights. Rl 144-45. 
The trial court excludes evidence of MacDonald's 
contempt and mistreatment of the baby under rule 404(b) 
Before the trial court ruled on the Miranda motion, MacDonald 1noved 
to redact any part of the interviews in which MacDonald or the detectives 
discussed whether MacDonald: (1) called G.B. a "whiner"; (2) made racist 
comments about G.B.; (3) was jealous of G.B.; (4) flipped off G.B.; or (5) 
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yelled at G.B. R298-300. MacDonald argued that this evidence was 
inadmissible under rules 402, 403, and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Id. 
The State opposed this motion. R376-85. The State then filed a 
motion in limine to admit the challenged statements as well as additional 
evidence about MacDonald's mistreahnent of G.B., including that 
MacDonald had hurt G.B. by picking him up by his arms and roughly 
dropping him on the beanbag chairs, and by squeezing his cheeks to the 
point of bruising while giving him medicine. R953-61. The State argued 
that the evidence was relevant for the proper noncharacter purposes of 
showing MacDonald's motive for hurting the baby, to rebut MacDonald's 
claim that the baby's injuries were accidental, and to provide context for the 
alleged abuse. R1066-68. 
The court issued a written ruling allowing some of the 404(b) 
evidence but excluding other parts of it. Rl 163-78 (Addendum C). The 
court ruled that evidence of MacDonald's racist comments could be 
admitted for the noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's contempt 
for the baby. R1167-68. But the court excluded other evidence of 
MacDonald's contempt for the baby: 
e "'Whiner": The court accepted the State's argument that 
evidence that MacDonald had called G.B. a "whiner" was 
offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing 
MacDonald's "contempt" for G.B. But it ruled that the 
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evidence's probative value was minimal and outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice-namely, that the jury would 
unfairly judge MacDonald for being an "impatient or bad 
father." R1168-69. 
• Flipping off G.B.: The court also accepted the State's argument 
that evidence that MacDonald had flipped G.B. off was offered 
for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's 
11 
contempt" for the baby. But the court ruled that its probative 
value was minimal and outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. Rl 166-67. 
• Yelling: The court ruled that there was no proper noncharacter 
purpose for presenting evidence that MacDonald had often 
yelled at G.B. R1169. The court did not enter a separate rule 
403 ruling about the yelling evidence. 
• Past mistreatment: The court likewise ruled that evidence of 
MacDonald's past mistreatment was not offered for any 
noncharacter purpose. It also ruled that any potential probative 
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. R1164-65. 
• Jealousy: Finally, the court ruled that evidence of MacDonald's 
jealousy toward G.B. "is not a prior bad act subject to Rule 
404(b). Instead, the court analyzed this evidence under rule 402 
alone. The court then ruled that such evidence was irrelevant 
to whether MacDonald would II commit a violent act" against 
G.B. and was thus inadmissible. R1165-66. 
This Court granted the State's timely petition for interlocutory review 
of both the Miranda and the 404(b) rulings. Rl 180. The h·ial court 
proceedings are stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. R1185. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Issue I: The h·ial court erred when it suppressed the first and second 
interviews. 
First, Miranda warnings were not required because MacDonald was 
not in custody for any of the interviews. A suspect is in custody for Miranda 
purposes when he is arrested or .his freedom of movement is significantly 
restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest. In both interviews, 
MacDonald voluntarily came to the police station, was not restrained, was 
interviewed by unarmed plain-clothes detectives, and was not threatened or 
coerced. At the beginning of both interviews, officers made arrangements 
to take MacDonald home afterward, thereby signaling that he would not be 
arrested. And in the second interview, officers expressly told him that they 
were not going to arrest him. Because MacDonald was never in custody, 
Miranda warnings were not required. The suppression rulings should be 
overturned for this reason alone. 
Second, even if Miranda warnings were required, MacDonald 
received Miranda warnings and validly waived his rights in his first 
interview. Under Berghuis v. Thompkins, a suspect impliedly waives his 
rights when, with a full understanding of those rights, he acts inconsistently 
with them- such as by talking to police when police have told the suspect 
-19-
that he does not have to. Here, MacDonald was informed of his rights at the 
outset of the interview, acknowledged that he understood them, and then 
spoke with the detective. This was enough to constitute an implied waiver. 
Third, the trial court incorrectly concluded that MacDonald was not 
properly informed of his rights before the second interview. Once Miranda 
warnings are given, officers are not required to repeat them before every 
subsequent interview. Instead, so long as the suspect remembers and still 
understands his rights, a subsequent decision to speak is valid. Here, 
MacDonald acknowledged at the outset of the second interview that he 
remembered receiving his rights five days earlier during the first interview, 
and he never expressed any confusion or misunderstanding about his 
rights. His decision to speak was therefore knowing, and the trial court 
erred in suppressing this interview. 
Point II: The trial court improperly excluded evidence of 
MacDonald's contempt for and past mistreatment of the baby under rule 
404(b). 
First, just as evidence of MacDonald's racist comments were relevant 
to a non-character purpose, so too was the evidence the court excluded. 
Further, evidence of MacDonald's contempt for and past mistreatment of 
the baby was relevant to the noncharacter purposes of establishing 
-20-
MacDonald's motive for hurting the baby and to rebut MacDonald's claim 
that the baby was accidentally hurt. This Court and other courts have long 
held that evidence of an abuser's past contempt or mistreahnent of his 
victim is admissible for these very purposes. The evidence is also relevant 
to put the State's case in context, in that it illustrates the nature of 
MacDonald's relationship with G.B. 
Second, the probative value of this evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because MacDonald's intent 
is directly at issue, any prejudice MacDonald will suffer by its admission is 
fair, not unfair. Moreover, the excluded evidence is not so inflammatory 
that it is likely to rouse the jury to such overmastering hostility that it would 
convict MacDonald on an improper basis. This is particularly so given that 
the court decided to admit evidence of MacDonald's racist comments about 
the baby, evidence that would be as-if not more-inflammatory than the 




Because MacDonald was not in custody, Miranda warnings 
were not required; alternatively, MacDonald validly waived 
his Miranda rights. 
The trial court suppressed MacDonald's first interview because it 
concluded that MacDonald never validly waived his Miranda rights. It 
suppressed the second interview because it concluded that MacDonald was 
not properly informed of his Miranda rights. 
This Court should reverse because MacDonald was not in custody for 
either interview. The officers therefore were not required to give 
MacDonald his Miranda warnings, let alone secure a valid waiver of them. 
But even if MacDonald were in custody, he validly waived his rights before 
the first interview. And, contrary to the h·ial court's ruling, MacDonald 
received adequate Miranda warnings before the second interview. 
A. Miranda warnings were not required before either interview 
because MacDonald was not in custody. 
The trial court concluded that Miranda warnings were required before 
the first and second interviews because both were "custodial 
interrogations." R1148-50. The court was mistaken. 
The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly clarified that a 
suspect' s Miranda rights are contingent on his being subject to a custodial 
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interrogation." State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, ,192, 322 P.3d 624. A suspect is in 
custody for Miranda purposes when he has been formally arrested or had 
his "freedom of movement" restrained to a "degree associated with formal 
arrest." ].D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011); accord Perea, 2013 
UT 68, ~93 (person is in custody when he "has been taken into custody or 
otherwise deprived of his freedom in a significant way"). 
In deciding whether smneone is restrained to a degree associated 
with formal arrest, the court looks to "whether, in light of the objective 
circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person [would] have felt he 
or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."' State v. 
Heywood, 2015 UT App 191, ~49, 792 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (quoting Howes v. 
Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012)). Whether "an individual's freedom of 
movement was curtailed," however, is "the first step in the analysis, not the 
last." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Courts "must also consider 
'whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive 
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda." Id. 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Utah courts often consider four factors in assessing whether a 
restraint is akin to the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda: 
"(1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the 
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accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the 
length and forn1 of interrogation." State v. Mirquet, 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 
(Utah 1996); accord Heywood, 2015 UT App 191, if 50. "Indicia of arrest" 
include things like "readied handcuffs, locked doors, or drawn guns." 
Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1147; State v. Levin, 2007 UT App 65, if15, 156 P.3d 178. 
But no one "factor is dispositive." State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, 272 
P.3d 769. Instead, courts must "look to the totality of the circumstances" to 
determine whether the requisite degree of coercion-and thus custody-
was present. Id. 
Although the trial court here mentioned all four factors, it primarily 
relied on factors one and two: (1) the site of the interviews- the police 
station; and (2) the investigation focused on MacDonald because the 
officers' questions were" accusatory." Rl 148-50. 
But the United States Supreme Court has held that questioning a 
suspect at the police station does not mean the suspect was in custody. See 
genemlly Cnlifonzia v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983). After police suspected 
Beheler of being involved in a murder, Beheler "voluntarily agreed to 
accompany police to the station house" for an interview. Id. at 1122. Once 
there, "the police did not advise Beheler of the rights provided him under 
Miranda," but im1nediately launched into the interview. Id. 
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The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the statements were 
admissible because Beheler was not in custody. The Court held that 
"Miranda warnings are not required 'simply because the questioning takes 
place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom 
the police suspect."' Id. at 1125 (citation omitted). Instead, "police are 
required to give Miranda warnings only 'where there has been such a 
restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody."' Id. at 1124 
(quotations and citations omitted). Accusatory questioning at the police 
station was therefore not enough. See id. 
Thus, while an interview's site and the presence of accusatory 
questioning matter, the question of custody ultimately hinges on whether 
the suspect' s freedom was curtailed to a degree associated with formal 
arrest. See Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 1148 (the "necessary coercive environment 
cannot be established by accusatory questioning alone"); United States v. 
Lebrun, 363 F.3d 715, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) ("where there is no clear indication 
that the defendant's freedom to depart has been restricted, we have 
typically concluded that a police station interview was noncustodial"). 
This is true even when an officer clearly states "that the person under 
interrogation is a prime suspect."' State v. Worthington, 970 P.2d 714, 717 
(Utah App. 1998) (quoting Stansbury v. Cnlifornin, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994). 
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Such a statement "is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some 
suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest."' 
Id. (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324). 
Telling a suspect during the interview that he is "free to leave" and 
"not under arrest" strongly suggests that the suspect was not in custody. 
United States v. Galceran, 301 F.3d 927, 930 (8th Cir. 2002). Such assurances 
matter because they inform the suspect that "there is no arrest or restriction 
on his freedom of movement," which is the sin qua non of a custodial 
interrogation. Worthington, 970 P.2d at 716 (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Under these well-established standards, the trial court below 
erroneously concluded that MacDonald was in custody in the first and 
second interviews. While both interviews were conducted at the police 
station and involved some accusatory questioning, MacDonald's freedom 
was neither resh·ained nor subjected to arrest-like coercive pressure. In both 
cases, MacDonald voluntarily came to the police station. Rl 148-49, 1151. 
Both interviews were in an unlocked room. R1148, 1151. MacDonald was 
never restrained or placed in handcuffs. See generally State's Exh.'s 3 & 4. In 
both interviews, the detectives were unarmed and in plain clothes. And 
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MacDonald was never deprived of food or water-to the contrary, he had a 
water bottle with him throughout the first interview. See State's Exh. 3. 
MacDonald also was not isolated, which is the coercive effect Miranda 
sought to dispel. His grandfather waited for him outside during the first 
interview, and MacDonald expressed no concern when told that his 
grandfather decided not to wait for him during the second interview. 
Moreover, MacDonald had his cell phone with him during the second 
interview. State's Exh. 4 at 1:12:10. That fact, too, suggests that MacDonald 
was not in custody. See, e.g., United States v. Holleman, 743 F.3d 1152, 1160 
(8th Cir. 2014); Smith v. State, -- S.E.2d --, 2015 WL 5316786 (Ga. Sept. 14, 
2015). 
Moreover, toward the end of the first interview, Detective Metcalf 
openly discussed ways to get MacDonald home that night, thereby 
reminding him that he was free to leave. State's Exh. 3 at 1:08:19. And 
during the second interview, the detectives repeatedly told MacDonald that 
they had no "plans" or "intentions" of arresting him or taking him to jail. 
State's Exh. 4 at 7:10-57, 1:09:31, 1:12:36. 
In short, in both instances, MacDonald came voluntarily, was never 
threatened, was never restrained, was never isolated from the outside 
world, and received assurances that he would be allowed to leave. Because 
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he was never "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in a 
significant way," Miranda warnings were not required. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 
il 92. The trial court's suppression rulings should be overturned for this 
reason alone. 
B. Under Berghius v. Thompkins, MacDonald validly waived his 
Miranda rights before the first interview. 
Even if MacDonald were in custody, he validly waived his Miranda 
rights in both interviews. 
As stated, the h·ial court suppressed the first interview based on its 
conclusion that although MacDonald was advised of his rights, he did not 
validly waive them either expressly or impliedly. R1150. The trial court 
was correct as to the lack of an express waiver. Detective Metcalf asked 
MacDonald if he understood his rights, but he did not ask MacDonald if he 
waived them. State's Exh. 3 at 5:24. 
But the trial court was wrong that there was no implied waiver. As 
"a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a 
full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with 
their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those 
rights afford." Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,385 (2010). Thus, when a 
Miranda warning is given and is "understood by the accused, an accused's 
uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain 
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silent." Id. at 384. In other words, if a suspect who, after hearing his rights, 
says that he understands those rights and then goes ahead and talks to 
police, he has implicitly waived those rights. 
That's exactly what happened here. Before the first interview, 
Detective Metcalf infonned MacDonald of each of his Miranda rights. State's 
Exh. 3 at 5:02-5:24. MacDonald made eye contact with Detective Metcalf 
throughout this colloquy, and he answered "yes" when the detective asked 
whether he understood those rights. Id. Under Berg/mis, this constituted an 
implied waiver. 
The trial court here nevertheless concluded that any implied waiver 
was invalid because the detective undermined the Miranda warnings when 
he suggested that MacDonald did not need his rights read to him: 
Before we begin chatting, I just want to let you know, we've, 
this is kind preliminary, we do this with everybody, ok, we 
just want everyone to know, and you've probably heard this 
on TV, your rights, ok? I'm not sure if you particularly need 
these rights because we're just kind of asking what's going on 
with [G.B.]. But I just wanted to get that out of the way, ok. 
State's Exh. 3 at 4:30-5:02. The court reasoned that these comments so 
"undermined" the Miranda warnings that it rendered any waiver 
unknowing. Rl150. 
The h·ial court was mistaken. As an initial 1natter, the court was 
1nistaken that the officer's statement "undermined" the rights at all. The 
-29-
officer never told MacDonald that he did not have these rights or that they 
weren't important. Rather, all he did was seek to assure MacDonald that he 
was not in trouble at that point, a statement that was h·ue. 
Despite this, the trial court seems to have concluded that this 
statement made the waiver unknowing. But again, a suspect impliedly 
waives his rights when, with a full understanding of his rights, he chooses 
to speak with officers anyway. Bergliuis, 560 U.S. at 384. In assessing this, 
courts look to the "totality of the circumstances," including the suspect' s 
mental state, his age, and his "level of education." State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 
43, if il 17-18, 1 P.3d 1087. This inquiry does not turn on whether the suspect 
"was in an optimal mental state" when he decided to speak to officers; 
rather, it turns on whether the suspect "was able to understand his 
important, yet relatively simple Miranda rights." Id. at iJ27. In Bybee, for 
example, a waiver was knowingly made, even though it was made by a 
"severely depressed" 17-year-old 10th-grade dropout who was in an in-
patient h·eatment facility when he was interviewed by police. Id. at ilif 4, 10, 
22. Despite these cognitive problems, the suspect, who had only an 
"average intelligence," was still able to "comprehend[ ] his right to re1nain 
silent," therefore making his decision to speak to officers anyway a knowing 
one. Id. at ,I21. 
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Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, telling a suspect that he's not 
in trouble does not change this. In United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 
40-42 (2d Cir. 1997), for example, the Second Circuit held that even though 
the officer falsely assured the suspect that he "wasn't in trouble" before 
beginning the interview, the suspect' s decision to speak to the officer was 
still valid because the suspect understood what his rights were. 
The same is true here. MacDonald was a 23-year-old college student 
at the time of this interview. State's Exh. 3 at 7:56, 9:16. Nothing in this 
record suggests that he was impaired or cognitively challenged at all, let 
alone in such a pronounced manner that he was incapable of understanding 
his "relatively simple Miranda rights" when they were read to him. Bybee, 
2000 UT 43, if 27. Moreover, Detective Metcalf never told MacDonald that 
he did not have the right to ren1ain silent. Instead, at most, the detective 
suggested that he thought MacDonald did not need to exercise that right 
because Detective Metcalf didn't think MacDonald had done anything 
wrong at that point. State's Exh. 3 at 4:30-5:02. When MacDonald chose to 
speak with him, he therefore did so with a full understanding of his right 
not to. 
In short, the record shows that "a Miranda warning was given" and 
"was understood" by MacDonald. Berg/mis, 560 U.S. at 384. MacDonald's 
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decision to speak with the detective thus established "an implied waiver of 
the right to ren1ain silent." Id. The trial court erred in holding otherwise. 
C. MacDonald's decision to speak to the detectives in the second 
interview was properly informed because he acknowledged 
that he had been advised of his rights just five days earlier. 
The trial court suppressed the second interview because it believed 
that MacDonald had not been fully advised of his Miranda rights. The trial 
court acknowledged that the detectives had "reminded" MacDonald that he 
had been read his Miranda rights in the first interview and that MacDonald 
"nodded affirmatively" in response, but reasoned that this was not enough 
to show that MacDonald had been advised of his rights. R1148-49. 
As noted, Berghuis established that a suspect impliedly waives his 
Miranda rights when, after receiving those rights, he speaks to police. Such 
a waiver is not undone by the passage of time so long as nothing in the 
interim "caused him to forget the rights of which he had been advised and 
which he had understood" earlier. Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 49 (1982). 
Whether an earlier Miranda warning and waiver remained valid after an 
interruption depends on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 47-49. 
In State v. Teuscher, this Court recognized that while "Miranda 
warnings do not have 'unlimited efficacy or perpetuity,' a warning once 
given may have continuing effect beyond the interview in question." State 
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v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 930 n.5 (Utah App. 1994), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 144 P.3d 1096. Thus, although three days 
passed between the warned interview and the unwarned interview, this 
Court held that the warnings and waiver remained valid. Id. 
Other courts have followed this approach. The Tenth Circuit, for 
example, has stressed that "[n]umerous courts have rejected the argument 
that the passage of time alone invalidates previously given Miranda 
warnings." Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001 ). Instead, 
once the defendant is warned, the question is whether, because of the 
passage of time or some other factor, the defendant had forgotten II the 
rights of which he had been advised" before waiving them during the 
subsequent interview. Id. at 1058; accord United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214, 
222 (5th Cir. 2005) (" the passage of time is not itself necessarily sufficient to 
render Miranda warnings ineffective/' and the question remains whether the 
suspect "either no longer understood those warnings or did not appreciate 
their applicability" during subsequent questioning). 
While II no mechanical rule" measures II the longest permissible 
interval between the last warning and the accused's statement," the "mere 
lapse of time" does not automatically render a previous Miranda warning 
invalid. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1264. Warnings must be repeated only 
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when the earlier warnings "are so stale and remote that a substantial 
possibility exists that the suspect was unaware of his or her constitutional 
rights at the time subsequent interrogation occurs."' State v. Frazier, 622 
N.W.2d 246, 254 (S.D. 2001) (quoting People v. Baltimore, 685 N.E.2d 627, 630 
(Ill. App. 1997)). 
Applying this rule, courts have concluded that prior Miranda 
warnings remained valid in situations involving comparable or even longer 
time gaps than the one at issue here. See, e.g., Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 
118, 122 (5th Cir. 1975) (12-day gap); Koger v. State, 17 P.3d 428, 431-32 (Nev. 
2001) (12-day gap); Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182,_ 1189-90 (Fla. 1997) (8-day 
gap); Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, (11th Cir. 1985) (5-day gap), 
abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Singletary 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 
1994); Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1968) (3-day gap); 
United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2005) (2-day gap); People 
v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 290, 306 (Cal. 1991) (36-hour gap); Osborne v. State, 430 
S.E.2d 576,578 (Ga. 1993) (1-day gap). 
This is particularly so when, at the outset of the subsequent interview, 
officers remind the suspect of the warnings he received during the initial 
interview and then confirm that the suspect remembers them. See, e.g., 
United States v. Nguyen, 608 F.3d 368, 375 (8th Cir. 2010); Koger, 17 P.3d at 
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431-32; Ex Parle Landrum, 57 So.3d 77, 88-89 (Ala. 2010). In such cases, the 
suspect's acknowledgment of the earlier warning is a strong indicator that 
the suspect both remembers and still understands his rights. 
MacDonald was advised of his Miranda rights before his first 
interview, after which he told Detective Metcalf that he understood them. 
State's Exh. 3 at 5:24. Then, before the second interview, Detective Ludlow 
reminded MacDonald of the warnings he received only five days earlier: "I 
know you talked with, was it Detective Metcalf the other day?" State's Exh. 
4 at 0:50. MacDonald responded affirmatively. Id. Detective Ludlow then 
confirmed that MacDonald remembered the earlier warnings: "When he 
brought you in, he talked to you about your rights and all that stuff? You 
remember all that stuff, right?" Id. MacDonald again responded 
affirmatively by nodding his head. See id. 
And MacDonald's statements during the third interview corroborate 
that he remembered and understood his rights. As the trial court 
recognized, the detectives informed MacDonald of his rights at the outset of 
that interview and obtained an express waiver. Notably, when Detective 
Liddiard told MacDonald that he "didn't make any mistake about your 
Miranda rights," and reminded him that he could "just tell us if you're still 
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willing to talk to us, is that ok," MacDonald responded: "I understand, you 
have to do it." State's Exh. 5 at 0:58-1:48. 
In short, the second interview was bookended by two interviews in 
which MacDonald was expressly advised of his rights and chose to speak to 
officers anyway. MacDonald never expressed any confusion about his 
rights, nor has he ever proffered any fact suggesting that he had forgotten 
them. The trial court therefore erred in suppressing the second interview. 
D. The written statement MacDonald filled out at the end of the 
second interview was also admissible. 
At the close of the second interview, MacDonald filled out a written 
statement on a preprinted form. At the top of that form, MacDonald signed 
an acknowledgement of his Miranda rights. See January 23 Statement. 
The trial court briefly discussed this written statement in its ruling. 
R1146. There, the court appears to have concluded that the Miranda waiver 
on that written statement did not retroactively cure the detectives' earlier 
failure to give the warnings before the interview began under Missouri v. 
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). Id. As discussed, however, the interview itself 
was admissible because the Miranda warnings that MacDonald had earlier 
received remained valid. 
Though somewhat unclear, it appears that the trial court also may 
have meant to separately suppress the written statement itself. Rl 146-47. If 
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it did, that ruling should be overturned for the same reason: namely, 
because the Miranda warning given during the first interview remained 
valid, MacDonald's written statement was properly informed-particularly 
given that MacDonald then signed a Miranda waiver before filling this 
statement out. 
If the trial court meant to suggest that Seibert would also invalidate 
that written waiver-thereby rendering the written statement itself 
inadmissible- the court was wrong. Seibert was a fractured case that 
produced no controlling majority opinion. But the Supreme Court has since 
adopted the position taken by Justice Kennedy in his Seibert concurrence: 
namely, that what Seibert prohibits is the use of a "calculated" "two-step 
interrogation technique" in which officers question a suspect without giving 
him the warnings, only to then immediately give the warnings and procure 
an identical confession in one "blended" "continuum" that effectively 
"undermines" the efficacy of the warnings. Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S.Ct. 26, 31 
(2011). 
This is far from what happened here. As discussed, at the beginning 
of this interview, detectives affirmatively reminded MacDonald of the 
warnings that he had earlier received. After speaking with MacDonald for 
an hour and 12 minutes, officers then left him alone in the interview room 
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for over hour, only to then come back and provide him with a written form 
that contained a recitation of the Miranda warning. See State Exh. 4 at 1:12-
2:20. Thus, unlike the situation at issue in Seibert, MacDonald was 
effectively given the warnings twice- once through a reminder, and once 
directly-and because there was an hour gap between the end of the 
interview and receipt of the written statement, there was no "blended 
continuum" that undermined the later warning. To the extent that the trial 
court meant to separately suppress the written statement, this Court should 
therefore hold that it was admissible independent of the verbal statements 
made during the January 23 interview. 
II. 
Evidence that MacDonald hated the baby and treated him 
roughly was admissible under rules 404(b) and 403. 
In its rule 404(6) ruling, the trial court admitted evidence of 
MacDonald's racist comments, concluding that his "feelings" toward G.B. 
"in the weeks before" he was injured "are relevant to proving who injured" 
him. Rl 168. The court thus concluded that the "probative value of these 
statements is high" and that it was "unlikely that these statements [would] 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." R1167-68. Indeed, the court 
thought that the racist comments were "tame in comparison to the alleged 
abuse." Rl 167-68. 
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The court, however, excluded evidence that MacDonald called the 
baby a whiner, flipped the baby off, yelled at the baby, was jealous of him, 
and had hurt him before. R1165-69. As detailed above, the court concluded 
that this evidence was either not relevant to a non-character purpose or 
unfairly prejudicial. See id. 
The trial court abused its discretion. If the evidence of MacDonald's 
racism was admissible, so too was the other evidence detailed above. 
A. Evidence of the defendant's past conduct towards the same 
victim is routinely admitted for proper non-character purposes. 
"Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 
acted in conformity with the character." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(l). Such 
evidence II may be admissible," however II for another purpose, such as 
proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
absence of mistake, or lack of accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
Rule 404(b) is an "' inclusionary rule,"' presumptively admitting 
evidence so long as it is relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose. See State 
V. Bair, 2012 UT App 106, ,r17, 275 P.3d 1050 (quoting State V. Decorso, 1999 
UT 57, if 24, 993 P.2d 837). To be relevant, the evidence must also go to a 
contested issue at trial. See State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,I,I24-26, 296 P.3d 673. 
Even if the evidence tends to show a bad character trait, this alone does not 
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render it inadmissible; rather, it "is only excluded where the sole reason it is 
being offered is to prove bad character or to show that a person acted in 
conformity with that character." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah 
App. 1994) (citations and additional quotation marks omitted); accord Verde, 
2012 UT 60, ~24; 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence§ 404.20 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d 
ed. 1997) (updated 2010) ("Rule 404(b) adopts an inclusionary approach, 
generally providing for the admission of all evidence of other acts that is 
relevant to an issue in trial, excepting only evidence offered to prove 
criminal propensity"); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirckpatrick, 
Federal Evidence§ 4.21 at 692 (3d ed. 2007) (same).4 
To be ad1nissible, acts must be (1) relevant (2) to a proper, 
noncharacter purpose and (3) their probative value must not be 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Bair, 2012 UT 
App 106, i!17; accord State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ~13, 328 P.3d 841 ("evidence 
of prior bad acts must be relevant and offered for a genuine, noncharacter 
4 Because the language of the federal rule is identical, Utah courts 
consider sources interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority of the 
meaning of Utah's rule. See State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ~43 n.5, 993 
P.2d 232. 
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purpose; furthermore, the probative value of the evidence must not be 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice"). 
Courts have long recognized the admissibility of evidence of a 
defendant's past words or conduct toward the same person who is alleged 
to be the victim in the present case. In cases where the defendant is alleged 
to have intentionally hurt the victim, for example, the State is permitted to 
introduce evidence that presents "the jury with a reason" why the 
defendant would do so, "thus making 'more plausible"' the '"State's theory 
that he did so intentionally,"' rather than accidentally. State v. Eisner, 2001 
UT 99, ,158, 37 P.3d 1073. 
Utah courts have commonly admitted such evidence in child abuse 
cases. Our" child abuse case law clearly indicates that evidence of instances 
of uncharged abuse involving the same victim and the same defendant is 
admissible for proper noncharacter purposes." State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, 
,146, 191 P.3d 17. "Such evidence is often indicative of the defendant's state 
of mind and completes the story of the charged abuse." Id. (quotations and 
citations omitted). "Furthermore, evidence of prior child abuse is allowed 
to show identity, intent or mental state, and lack of accident or mistake." Id. 
(quotations and citations omitted); accord State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68, 'if 26, 8 
P.3d 1025 (admitting "evidence of multiple instances of sexual contact with 
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the victim in this case" because it demonstrated "an ongoing behavior 
pattern which included [the defendant's] abuse of the victim," "the manner 
in which [he] intensely pursued the victim," and "the extensive preparation 
and planning in which [he] engaged to create opportunities for sexual 
contact with the victim"); Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 927 ("Evidence regarding 
prior instances of abuse perpetrated against the victim is clearly admissible 
in Utah to show identity, intent or mental state, and lack of accident or 
mistake."). 
"The theory underlying the introduction of evidence regarding a 
prior violent relationship" between a defendant and the alleged victim "is 
not that the assailant is a bad person and that bad people are likely to 
commit the charged offense." State v. LaRock, 470 S.E.2d 613, 630 n.27 
(W.Va. 1996). "Instead the theory under which such evidence is allowed 
arises from the idea that, when a defendant has demonstrated the same type 
of violence towards a victim on a recent occasion, it is probative of his or her 
intent, motive, malice, and premeditation." Id. Thus, the evidence is 
properly admitted to" demonstrate some prior animosity to explain why the 
accused had a 1notive to do the illegal acts charged in the indictment." Id. 
In this sense, the evidence of the "prior relationship between the defendant" 
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and his alleged victim is not only "relevant, it is also considered crucial 
evidence in proving premeditation" or intentional conduct. Id. 
And in shaken baby cases like this one, courts have long allowed 
prosecutors to introduce evidence of the defendant's past animosity or 
abuse toward the victim for proper non-character purposes. In State v. Mott, 
for example, the Arizona Supreme Court held that evidence that the 
defendant had previously struck a child and said that she "hated" her was 
admissible to show the defendant's motive in a prosecution for violently 
shaking her. 931 P.2d 1046, 1055 (Ariz. 1997). The court explained that this 
evidence "de1nonstra ted defendant's lack of concern or actual dislike for her 
child, which could reasonably be construed as a motive for the charged 
offenses." Id. 
In Smith v. State, the Arkansas Court of Appeals similarly held that 
evidence that the defendant, a day care caregiver, had told the baby to "shut 
up" and had been rough with him was ad1nissible in her prosecution for 
shaking him. 205 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Ark. App. 2005). The court explained 
that this evidence showed the defendant's "mental state" and "the absence 
of mistake or accident." Id. The court further held that this evidence 
11 tended to show" that the def end ant "manifested indifference" to the 
child's "well-being," and that the "h·ier-of-fact was entitled to know" about 
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the past incidents because they "tended to contradict" the defendant's claim 
that the victim's "injuries were the result of an accident." Id. 
B. Evidence of MacDonald's yelling and past mistreatment was 
relevant for the proper non-character purposes of establishing 
motive, lack of accident, and context. 
As noted, under the first step of the 404(b) analysis, evidence is 
admissible if it "tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime 
charged- other than defendant's propensity to commit crhne." Lucero, 2014 
UT 15, ~17. Proper purposes include, but are not limited to, "motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident." Utah R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
Here, the trial court admitted evidence of MacDonald's racist 
comments toward G.B., ruling that they were relevant to the proper non-
character purpose of showing MacDonald's contempt- and, thus, his 
motive for harming-the baby R1167-68. The trial court also ruled that 
evidence that MacDonald called G.B. a "whiner" and flipped him off was 
offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing MacDonald's 
"contempt" for the baby. R1166-69. But the court inexplicably ruled that 
evidence of MacDonald's past yelling at the baby and his past abuse of the 
baby were not offered for any proper noncharacter purpose. R1164-65. 
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Evidence of MacDonald's yelling and past abuse was properly 
offered for the same purposes as the evidence of MacDonald's racist 
comments, name-calling, and obscene gestures. Like that evidence, this 
evidence also shows MacDonald's motive for harming this baby-namely, 
his "contempt" for him. R1166-69. And, like that evidence, this evidence 
rebuts MacDonald's current claim that this baby was injured accidentally. 
The "trier-of-fact" is "entitled to know" all of this evidence precisely 
because it "tend[s] to contradict" MacDonald's claim that G.B.'s "injuries 
were the result of an accident," and also because it makes '"more plausible"' 
the State's theory that MacDonald had a motive to intentionally hurt G.B. 
Smith, 205 S.W.3d at 178; Bisner, 2001 UT 99, if 58. 
In addition to proving motive and lack of accident, this evidence is 
also admissible for the proper noncharacter purpose of showing context. A 
prosecutor retains "the right to present evidence with broad narrative value 
beyond the establishment of particular elements of a crime." State v. Verde, 
2012 UT 60, if 28, 296 P.3d 673. This Court has also repeatedly recognized 
that "other acts evidence may be admissible under rule 404(b) to show 
context." State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, i122, 318 P.3d 1151; see also State v. 
Havatone, 2008 UT App 133, if 10, 183 P.3d 257; State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT 
App 158, if 21, 72 P.3d 127. 
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The supreme court's decision in State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 
1983), illustrates this. There, the defendant was convicted of killing her 
three-year-old daughter. Id. at 541. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed 
the admission of evidence of past abuse, holding that it was admissible to 
show, among other things, identity. Id. at 548. But the court also went on to 
explain that "logic and the interests of justice demand as complete a story as 
possible concerning the crime [ of child abuse] and the surrounding 
circumstances," which included the prior injuries. Id. This Court has thus 
recognized that the State is entitled to "legitimate moral force of its 
evidence." State v. Stapley, 2011 UT App 54, ,I13, 249 P.3d 572; see also State 
v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, if 37, 106 P.3d 734. 
Here, the nature of MacDonald's relationship with G.B. is a critical 
aspect of this case. MacDonald told detectives that he "loved" G.B. and 
would not mistreat him. State's Exh. 4 at 31:00-32:12, 42:41; State's Exh. 5 at 
33:45, 39:36, 41:44, 43:34, 49:18. The excluded evidence here shows 
otherwise. For the jury to answer the central questions of how and why 
MacDonald hurt G.B., it must know what their relationship was like. 
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Excluding this evidence will prevent the jury from seeing the true picture of 
that relationship. 5 
C. The strong probative value of this evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. 
The excluded evidence was also admissible under rule 403. Under 
that rule, relevant evidence '"may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' Lucero, 2014 UT 15, 
i(30 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 403). The rule is an "inclusionary rule," and 
"presumes the admission of all relevant evidence except where the evidence 
has an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or 1nislead the 
jury." State v. Otkovic, 2014 UT App 58, iJ15, 322 P.3d 746 (quotations and 
citation omitted). If the evidence "is prejudicial but is at least equally 
5 As noted, the trial court also concluded that evidence of 
MacDonald's jealousy fell outside the 404(b) context. Instead, the court 
concluded that this evidence was inadmissible under a direct relevancy 
analysis. See R1164-69; see also Utah R. Evici. 401 & 402. 
Evidence is relevant if it "has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
Here, the jealousy evidence is relevant for the same reasons described 
above-namely, it helps establish MacDonald's contempt for G.B., thereby 
(1) showing that he had a motive to hurt him, and (2) refuting MacDonald's 
claim that the baby's injuries were accidentally inflicted. 
Evidence showing that MacDonald was jealous of G.B. makes it more 
probable that he hurt him intentionally, rather than accidentally. The trial 
court thus also erred in concluding that it was irrelevant. 
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probative," "it is properly admissible." Id. (quotations and citation 
omitted). 
Here, the trial court concluded that evidence of MacDonald's racist 
comments was admissible under this test. But the court then concluded that 
evidence that MacDonald called G.B. a "whiner," flipped the baby off, and 
abused him was inadmissible under rule 403 because, in the court's view, its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. R1164-69. 
But if evidence of MacDonald's racist comments toward G.B. is 
admissible under rule 403, then evidence of MacDonald's name-calling, 
obscene gestures, and prior mistreatment was admissible too. Like the 
racist comment evidence, the excluded evidence has strong probative value. 
The infant victim in this case obviously cannot speak for himself. Thus, 
MacDonald- if he chooses to testify-will be the only person who was in 
the room that day who can testify about what happened. 
MacDonald's police interviews provide some sense of what that 
testimony will be. There, MacDonald claimed that he "loved" G.B., and he 
repeatedly denied having any reason to hurt him. State's Exh. 4 at 31:00-
32:12, 42:41; State's Exh. 5 at 33:45, 39:36, 41:44, 43:34, 49:18. To prove its 
case, the State must therefore give the jury a plausible reason why this adult 
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man would violently assault a helpless baby that he now claims to love. 
Like the racist comment evidence that the court deemed admissible, the 
excluded evidence does precisely that by showing that MacDonald hated 
G. B. and had previously acted on his feelings through verbal and physical 
mistreatment. 
That high probative value is not substantially outweighed by any 
danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 404(b) does not speak of mere prejudice to 
the defendant-it speaks of "unfair prejudice." Evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial merely "because it is detrimental to a party's case." McCullar, 
2014 UT App 215, if48 (quotations and citation omitted). "[U]nfair 
prejudice" exists "only where the evidence has an undue tendency to 
suggest decision upon an improper basis." Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,132 
(quotations and citation omitted). "Only when evidence poses a danger of 
rousing the jury to overmastering hostility does it reach the level of unfair 
prejudice that rule 403 is designed to prevent." Killpack, 2008 UT 49, ,153. 
Under rule 403's "more specialized meaning" of prejudice, exclusion 
is not required merely because the evidence "possesses a tendency to 
suggest a decision upon an improper basis." State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 
984 (Utah 1989). Instead, the "critical question is whether certain testimony 
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is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the evidence." 
State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12, ~27, 133 P.3d 363. 
Here, MacDonald will suffer no unfair prejudice from admitting this 
evidence. Like the racist comment evidence, which will be admitted, it 
suggests that MacDonald disliked his girlfriend's baby. But nothing in that 
suggests that MacDonald has a propensity to abuse children in general. 
Rather, what it shows is that he had a reason to hurt this particular baby 
and had acted on that reason in the past. Thus, any prejudice that he will 
suffer from the evidence is fair, not unfair. 
In addition, this evidence is "tame in comparison" to other evidence 
that will be admitted at trial. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ~35. First, the jury is 
already going to hear about MacDonald's racist comments. The excluded 
evidence only confirms his dislike for the baby. Second, this jury is going to 
hear graphic evidence about G.B.'s injuries, including evidence of severe 
retinal hemorrhages, subdural bleeding, and damage to the baby's internal 
organs. It will also hear from doctors who will testify that such injuries do 
not occur accidentally, that they are caused only by significant force. When 
coupled with the undisputed testimony that MacDonald was the only adult 
with the baby when he was injured, the implication will be that MacDonald 
intentionally and violently hurt him. 
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If the jury believes this medical evidence, it will necessarily believe 
that MacDonald intentionally shook this baby hard enough to cause severe, 
life-threatening injuries. But if it doesn't believe this medical evidence- if, 
for example, it accepts anticipated testimony from MacDonald's experts 
suggesting that these injuries are not consistent with shaken baby 
syndrome- it will likely acquit. 
Evidence of MacDonald's contempt and past mistreatment of G.B. 
·helps explain MacDonald's motives. But it is not likely that a jury that does 
not believe that the baby's injuries were caused by violent shaking would 
convict MacDonald of second degree felony child abuse merely because it 
learned that he disliked him. In sum, the evidence is admissible under a 403 
analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court's 
rulings. 
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Utah R. Evid. 404. Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Ex-
ceptions; Other Crimes 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of 
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered 
by the prosecution; 
(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim of-
fered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conform-
ity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
( c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases. 
(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, 
evidence of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible 
to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution 
in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 
(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in 
relation to a child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a 
sexual offense or an attempt to commit a sexual offense. 
(3) Rule 404( c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissi-
ble under Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence. 
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FINDNG OF FACTS, CONCLUSION OF 
LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
IN PART AND DENYING THE MOTION 
IN PART 
CASE NO. 131400351 
JUDGE: Derek P. Pullan 
Pursuant to Defendant's briefs, the State's verbal response, the evidentiary hearing and oral 
arguments, the Court hereby makes the following finding of facts, conclusion of law and order: 
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I. 
I. 
FINDING OF FACTS 
Defendant's Interview on January 18, 2013 
1. On January 18, 2013, in American Fork, Utah, a 911 call was made regarding G.B., a 
I 0-month old, who was not breathing. At the time of the call, defendant was 
watching G.B., his girlfriend's son. 
2. After paramedics transported G.B. to the hospital, Detective Christensen interviewed 
defendant at his home. After the initial interview at the scene, Detective Metcalf 
transported defendant to the American Fork police station for further questioning. 
3. Detective Metcalf interviewed defendant regarding the events that led up to the child 
sustaining injuries. 
4. The interview room door was closed but not locked. 
5. Detective Metcalf was the only other person in the interview room, other than the 
defendant. 
6. The interview was audio and video recorded. 
7. During the interview, defendant stated that G.B. had fal1en asleep on the living room 
floor. He picked up G.B. and laid him down in his crib. When defendant later 
checked on G.B., he found him unresponsive with vomit on his mouth and not 
breathing. Defendant yelled for his roommate to help. The roommate called 911 and 
began CPR. Paramedics and police arrived on scene and took over resuscitation 
efforts. G.B. was transported to American Fork Hospital. 
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8. After the interview, defendant was not arrested and a police officer transported him 
back to his residence. 
9. The Court finds that defendant was interrogated. 
1 O.The proximity of the interrogation is close in time to the child having suffered 
serious physical injury. 
11.The interview was accusatory in nature. 
12.Detective MetcaJfs Jine of questioning implied that defendant did something wrong. 
13 .Defendant was left alone in the interrogation room for approximately forty minutes 
during the course of the interview. 
14.The Court finds that defendant was not free to leave. 
15.The Court finds that defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
16.Although Detective Metcalf read defendant his Miranda rights, he failed to obtain an 
express waiver of Miranda rights, since he never asks defendant if he waived his 
rights. 
17.Additionally, the Court finds that Detective Metcalf undermined the Miranda 
warning when he stated he wasn't sure that defendant needed his rights to be read to 
him. 
18.The Court finds that defendant did not have a full awareness of the nature and 
consequences of the rights being abandoned and that an implied waiver was not the 
product of a free deliberate choice. 
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LEGAL CONCLUSION: 
Defendant's Interview on January 18, 2013 
1. The Court concludes that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and Detective 
Metcalf was required to provide defendant with the Miranda warning. 
2. The Court concludes there was no express waiver of Miranda rights. 
3. Expressions of police that undermine the importance of the constitutional rights described in 
the Miranda warning significantly impacts the Court's determination of whether or not 
waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 
4. The Court concludes there was no implied waiver. 
5. For these reasons, the Court grants the defendant's motion to suppress statements made by 
defendant to Detective Metcalf on January 18, 2013. 
II. 
FINDING OF FACTS: 
Defendant's Interview on January 23, 2013 
1. Doctors from the Primary Children's Hospital diagnosed G.B. with Abusive Head Trauma. 
Subsequently, defendant was requested by police to return to the police station for further 
questioning. 
2. Defendant's grandfather drove him to the American Fork police department on January;fh .. l 1 t.' (J 
Vv.L ;iv 
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2013. 
3. Sergeant Ludlow interviewed defendant, while Lieutenant Liddiard was also present in the 
room. 
4. The interview room was closed but not locked. 
5. The intervie,:v was audio and video recorded. 
6. During this interview, defendant provided additional information. He stated that while he 
carried a sleeping G.B. to his crib that he tripped on a rug, and that G.B. fell from his arms, 
and that his head hit the cement flooring. He then comforted the child and laid him down in 
his crib. 
7. After the interview, defendant was permitted to leave the police station with his grandfather 
and was not arrested at that time. 
8. The Court finds that the interview was an interrogation. The intei·view took place at the 
police station, defendant was the focus of the investigation and the questioning was 
accusatory. 
9. Sergeant Ludlow stated that everything was pointing at defendant and that there was more to 
the defendant's version of events. The Sergeant stated that defendant was being "deceitful" 
and continued to express his non-belief during the interrogation. 
l O.The Court finds that defendant did not feel free to leave. 
11.The Court finds that defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
12.Prior to defendant's statements, Sergeant Ludlow asked defendant if he remembered when 
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Detective Metcalf '"brought you in [and] talked to you about your rights and all that stuff? 
Do you remember all that stuff, right?" Defendant nods in the affirmative and Sergeant 
Ludlow proceeded to question him. 
13 .Sergeant Ludlow did not ask defendant if he was willing to speak to police, rather he 
continued with the interrogation. 
14.After defendant made statements to Sergeant Ludlow, he was then asked to provide a signed 
written statement that included the Miranda warning. 
15.The Court finds no express Miranda warning was given by Sergeant Ludlow. 
16.The interrogation occurred five days after the first interrogation. This fact is important to the 
Cow1, especially since defendant was not read his Miranda rights or asked if he \Vas willing 
to waive his rights. 
17.Sergeant Ludlow's reference to defendant's "rights and all that stuff," did not explain to 
defendant the Miranda warning in a way that would explain how to exercise his rights. 
18.The Court does not find facts that demonstrate an implied waiver. 
19.The Court finds the police asked questions first and then provided Miranda later. 
LEGAL CONCLUSION: 
Defendant's Interview on January 23, 2013 
1. The Court concludes that defendant was subjected to a custodial interrogation and Sergeant 
Ludlow was required to provide defendant \:Vith the Miranda warning. 
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1. That kind of reference to rights read five days earlier did not place defendant in a situation 
where he could make a waiver with full awareness, both as to the nature and consequence of 
the rights that he was abandoning. 
2. The fact that defendant signs a written statement with a Miranda warning after making 
statements during the course of the interrogation does not correct the previous mistake, 
pursuant to the ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
3. The State failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that there was either an express or implied 
waiver of Miranda rights. 
4. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that this interrogation resulted in an 
unwarned statement and grants defendant's motion to suppress the statements made to 
Sergeant Ludlow on January 23, 2013. 
III. 
FINDING OF FACTS: 
Defendant's Interview on January 24, 2013 
1. At the request of police, defendant returned to the American Fork police department for 
additional questioning. Defendant's grandfather drove him to the police department on 
January 24, 2013 
2. Defendant was interviewed by Lieutenant Liddiard. 
3. The interview door was closed but not locked. 
4. The interview was audio and video recorded. 
001146 
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5. At the beginning to the interview, Lieutenant Liddiard informed defendant that his 
grandfather had already gone home. Lieutenant Liddiard told the grandfather that he didn't 
know how long the interview would be. Lieutenant Liddiard told the grandfather that he 
would take defendant home. Defendant was then asked, "Is that okay if we just take you 
home?" Defendant replied, "That's fine." 
6. During the interview, defendant repeated the "tripping" and "dropping" statement. 
7. After this interview, police took defendant back to the residence to videotape him conducting 
a demonstration of the incident. 
8. Prior to defendant's statements, Lieutenant Liddiard referenced the Miranda warning given 
earlier by Detective Metcalf on January 18, 2013, and that Sergeant Ludlow had reminded 
defendant of his Miranda rights again on January 23, 2013 with Sergeant Ludlow. 
Lieutenant Liddiard then suggested to defendant that, "You 're still willing to talk to us 
today," to which defendant affirms. 
9. Then Lieutenant Liddiard gives a complete Miranda warning and asks defendant if he 
understands the rights. Defendant says, "Yes." Liddiard asks, HAre you still willing to talk to 
us?" Defendant affirms. 
l 0.Lieutenant Liddiard expressed his non-belief in defendant's story and the questioning was 
accusatory. Lieutenant Liddiard continued to tell defendant that his story was "impossible" 
and states that he is hiding something because of his body language. 
I I .Lieutenant Liddiard tells defendant that he is "killing his integrity." 
12.Lieutenant Liddiard repeatedly referenced the "tripping" and ""dropping" statements he made 
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on the previous day with Sergeant Ludlow. 
13.The Court finds that Defendant's interview with Lieutenant Liddiard, at the police station, 
was a custodial interrogation and that defendant did not feel free to leave. 
14.However, the Court finds that there was an express waiver and that defendant vo]untarily 
waived his Miranda rights. 
LEGAL CONCLUSION: 
Defendant's Interview on January 24, 2013 
I. The Miranda warning ,vas required to be given by Lieutenant Liddiard 
2. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that there was an express 
waiver and that it was voluntary. 
1. The Court concludes that a one day separation, between the January 23rd and 24th 
interviews, is a sufficient break between the unwarned statement and the subsequent warned 
statement, pursuant to the ruling in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
1. Therefore, the Court denies defendant's motion to suppress as to the third interrogation held 
on January 24, 2014, with Lieutenant Liddiard, at the police station. 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the defendant's motion to suppress statements made 
by defendant during his interviews on January 18, 2013 and on January 23, 2013. However, the 
Court denies the defendant's motion to suppress statements made during the interview conducted on 
0011 114 
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January 24, 2013. 
Court seal and signature located at the top of page 1. 
----------------------End of Order-----------------------
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AddendumC 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY,STATE OF UTAH 





RULING AND ORDER 
ON STATE'S SECOND MOTION 
TO ADMIT RULE 404(b) EVIDENCE 
Case No. 131400351 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
Defendant Robbie MacDonald is charged with one count of Child Abuse, a second 
degree felony. The State alleges that Defendant inflicted head trauma and brain damage upon his 
girlfriend's IO-month old son ("Gabriel") on or about January 18, 2013. 
The State moved to admit Rule 404(b) evidence including evidence that the Defendant 
(I) yelled frequently at Gabriel; (2) called Gabriel a "whiner;" (3) called Gabriel a "spick;" (4) 
"flipped off' Gabriel; and (5) was jealous of the attention Defendant's girlfriend (Addie 
Loveridge) paid to Gabriel. 
After hearing oral argument on the State's motion, the Court denied the State's motion to 
admit evidence that the Defendant yelled at Gabriel and called him a whiner. The Court granted 
the State's motion to admit evidence that the Defendant called Gabriel a uspick," "flipped oft'' 
Gabriel, and was jealous. 
After further reflection, the Court vacated its ruling granting in part the State's motion. 
The Court explained: 
Use of the term "spick" and flipping someone off might not be words and actions 
of sufficient contempt to motivate a person to violence. In analyzjng tlus issue 
the timing and frequency with which these words and actions were used are 
significant factors in determining whether they are being offered for an improper 
character purpose in violation of the Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). Furthermore, 
the depth and frequency of expressions of jealousy, and whether or not those 
sentiments changed over time are also important factors in determining whether 
evidence that the Defendant was jealous of the alleged victim is being offered for 
an improper character purpose .. 
(See, Order Vacating Prior Ruling, 11/26/14). 
Because Rule 404(b) evidence must be scrupulously examined, the Court scheduled the 
State's motion for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the State called only one witness-
Addie Loveridge (''Loveridge,,). 
Having carefully considered the evidence presented, the Court now enters the following: 
RULING 
Findings of Fact 
1. Loveridge met the Defendant in June or July 2012. She introduced Gabriel to Defendant 
in July 2012. Transcript of 1/20/15 Evidentia1y Hearing "Transcript1 "at 6. 
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2. Loveridge brought Gabriel to Defendant's grandparent's home for "play dates" with the 
Defendant's daughter (K.M.). These play dates occurred almost every other day for the 
next 4-5 months. Tra_nscript, at 7. 
3. During this period of time, Defendant commented five or six times that Gabriel "was 
slow'1 to develop-that he should be c1awling and eating by now. Id. at 10. 
4. Loveridge noticed that Defendant did not like to be touched by Gabriel and that he would 
not stop K.M. from pushing or hitting Gabriel. Id. at 10· 12. 
5. In late 2012, Loveridge and Defendant decided to move in together to "work on being a 
better family." Id. at 58. 
6. A mutual friend needed a roommate and so Loveridge and Defendant decided to move 
into the basement of the friend 1s home. This occurred during the first week of December 
2012, six weeks before Gabriel was injured. Id. 
7. At the 1ime Loveridge and Defendant moved in together, she was working on Fridays, 
Saturdays, and Sundays for approximately 20 hours per week. As Christmas 
approached, Loveridge took advantage of overtime opportunities and worked 30 hours 
per week. Defendant was not yet enrolled in school and was home 80% of the time. 
Defendant enrolled in school the week that Gabriel was injured. Id. at 14-16. 
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8. Loveridge testified that she went to San Diego, California for Christmas. She spent seven 
days there and returned before New Year's Day. Transcript, at 17. At the evidentiary 
hearing, the San Diego trip became a reference point for when events happened. 
9. From the date Loveridge and the Defendant moved in together until Loveridge left for 
San Diego, Defendant was with Gabriel every day. During this period: 
a. Defendant poked fun at Gabriel stating that "hjs eyes are crossed" and his "perns 
is very small." Id. at 19. 
b. Defendant would not stop K.M. from hitting Gabriel. Id. at 12. 
c. The Defendant picked up Gabriel by the anns, carried him across the room, and 
"plopped him down" on a bean bag chair. Loveridge stated that this was "too 
rough for my liking" and that she knew it hurt Gabriel because he was crying. 
Loveridge testified that this happened on several occasions, but two times before 
she left for San Diego. Id. at 22. 
d. Neither Gabriel nor K.M. was allowed in the bed that Loveridge and Defendant 
shared. Loveridge was required to breastfeed Gabriel in the child's room. Id. at 
27-28. 
10. From the day that Loveridge returned from San Diego to January 18, 2013, Loveridge 
witnessed the following: 
4 
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a. About one week before Gabriel was injured, he had a cold and runny nose. 
Loveridge normally administered the medicine to Gabriel. However, one time 
she asked the Defendant to do it. Thereafter, she observed bruises on both of 
Gabriel's cheeks. When she asked about this, Defendant told her that Gabriel had 
fallen on a toy. Transcript, at 35-36. 
b. On January 13, 2013, the couple got into a heated dispute. Before or during the 
argument, Defendant "flipped off' Gabriel with both hands. Loveridge witnessed 
this through the reflection in a fish tank. This was a kind of "last straw" for 
Loveridge. Defendant confessed to her that he was addicted to marijuana. 
Loveridge took the marijuana away. After the fight, Defendant agreed to be a 
better dad. Id. at 46-49. 
11. In the six weeks that Loveridge and the Defendant lived together, Loveridge witnessed 
the following: 
a. Defendant called Gabriel a "spick" no more than four times. Id. at 40. 
b. While looking for a new place to live, Loveridge and Defendant drove by a trailer 
park. Defendant stated that "Gabriel would fit in there because [the trailer park] 
is full of spicks, but the rest ofus wouldn't." This occurred after Christmas and 
after the Defendant signed up for school. Id. at 43. 
5 
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c. Defendant said "Gabriel does not fit in our family because he is brov..n." This 
occurred one time after Loveridge returned from San Diego. Id. at 44. 
d. Defendant called Gabriel uthe Mexican." Loveridge testified that this occurred 
''more than once for sure." Transcript, at 44-45. 
12. Loveridge testified as to several examples of bad parenting, including: 
a. Defendant had left both children unchanged resulting in them being covered in 
feces. Id. at 64. 
b. Defendant would not feed Gabriel when he was hungry, or at least would feed 
K.M. first. Id. at 25. 
c. Defendant would yell excessively. Id. at 53-54. 
13. Loveridge testified that Defendant v..-as jealous of Gabriel because Defendant (1) did not 
like Gabriel clinging to her; (2) encouraged her to leave the room and let Gabriel cry it 
out; (3) would pull Gabriel away from her; (4) encouraged Loveridge to get Gabriel's 
father to take him for parent time; and (5) wanted to have time with just her and K.M. Id. 
at 51-52. 
14. Finally, Loveridge testified that from the first week of December 2012 through January 
18, 2013, Defendant yelled constantly and excessively. Id. at 54. 
6 
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Conclusions of Law 
Three-Part Test to Determine Admissibility of Rule 404(b) Evidence 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in confonnity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. URE 404(b). The Utah Supreme Court developed a three part 
analysis to determine whether evidence is admissible under rule 404(b). State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ~~J 17-20: 
First, the court must determine if the bad acts evidence is being offered for a proper, non-
character purpose, such as one of those specifically listed in rule 404(b ). Second, the court must 
detennine whether the bad acts evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, which permits 
admission of only relevant evidence. Third, the court must determine whether the bad acts 
evidence meets the requirements of rule 403, which excludes evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
In determining whether the bad acts evidence meets rule 403 requirements, Utah courts 
may consider a number of factors, including those found in Shickles: (1) the strength of the 
evidence of the other bad acts; (2) the similarities between the crimes; (3) the interval of time 
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that has elapsed between the crimes; (4) the need for the evidence; (5) the efficacy of alternative 
proof; (6) the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering 
hostility. Stare v. Shick/es, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). 
The difficulty in applying rule 404(b) rises from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts 
often will yield dual inferences. State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60, ~ 16. Thus, when prior bad acts 
evidence is presented under rule 404(b), the court should carefully consider whether it is 
genuinely being offered for a proper, non-character purpose, or whether it might actually be 
aimed at sustaining an improper inference of action in conformity with a person's bad character. 
Id. at~ 18. If the evidence sustains both a proper and an improper inference under rule 404(b), 
the courts should also balance the two inferences against each other under rule 403 to determine 
which purpose dominates. The bad act evidence should be excluded if its tendency to sustain a 
proper inference is outweighed by its propensity for an improper inference or for jury confusion 
about its real purpose. Id. 
Rule 403 aml the Sfliclcles Factors 
While some of the factors laid out in Shick/es may be helpful in assessing probative value 
of the evidence in one context, they may not be helpful in another. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, 
~ 32. It is therefore unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every factor and balance them 
together in making their assessment. Id. This is because courts are bound by the test of Rule 
403, and not limited to the factors laid out in Shick/es. Id. 
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In Lucero, the State offered evidence of the mother's past child abuse in order to prove 
modus operandi and subsequently identity. The court used only a few of the Shick/es factors to 
reach its determination. The similarity of the injuries increased their probative value. The baby 
was injured in a similar way and by similar means on both occasions. Id. at~ 33. Moreover, the 
short interval of time within which the injuries occurred also increased their probative value. 
The court found that there was no risk of ovennastering hostility because the prior act was tame 
in comparison to the fatal injury. 
The court need not identify each of the Shick/es factors in its analysis as long as they 
make a sufficient inquiry under Rule 403. State v. Thornton, 2014 UT App 265, ~ 39. The trial 
court met the scrupulous examination requirement when it engaged in a three- or four-step 
analysis, on the record, of the requirements for admission of prior bad acts evidence. Lucero, ~ 
36-37. Failure to analyze each category of bad acts separately does not comport with the court's 
obligation to scrupulously examine 404(b) evidence. Thornton, at 142. 
Moreover, and touching on the State's argument of context in the instant case, when the 
charged crime and the prior acts are considered part of a single criminal episode, the evidence is 
inextricably intertwined and 404(b) is not implicated. Id at~ 43. Prior acts that provide 
necessary context to understand how the crimes occurred are not, however, "inextricably 
intertwined" so as to put the evidence beyond the reach of 404(b). Id. 
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Finally, where the context of the evidence involves a doctrine of chances analysis, Verde 
has displaced the Shick/es factors. State v. Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,I 28. When addressing the 
probative value of other acts evidence in cases not governed by the doctrine of chances, Shick/es 
factors remain relevant to the extent they are useful. Id. 
Ultimately, the court is not required to apply the Shick/es factors rigidly, but rather must 
carefully weigh the tendency of prior bad acts toward proper and improper inferences in the 
context of the particular case and consider whntever factors are relevant to that analysis as it 
scrupulously examines the evidence. Id. 
Tlte Prior Bad Act Evidence At Issue 
Yelling at the Cftildre11 
Evidence that the Defendant yelled at Gabriel and K.M. excessively is not offered for a 
proper non-character purpose. Rather, it is offered to show that the Defendant was an impatient 
father and therefore more likely to have acted in accordance with that bad character trait on 
January 18, 2013. 
For this reason, the Court denies the State's motion in limine to admit this evidence. 
Callilzg Gabriel a Whiner 
Thls prior bad act is offered for the proper non-character purpose of showing that the 
Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. The Defendant's ill-feelings towards Gabriel do make it 
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more likely that he assaulted him. However, calling someone a "whiner:' does not manifest the 
kind of deep-seated contempt that would move a person to cause serious bodily injury. The 
probative value of this statement is paper-thin and is substantially outweighed by the improper 
character purpose-that the Defendant is an impatient or bad father. 
For these reasons> the Court denies the State's motion in limine to admit this evidence. 
Using Racial Slurs Toward Gabriel 
Calling Gabriel a "spick," "the Mexican,,, and "brown" is offered for the proper non-
character purpose of proving that the Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. This is especially true 
in light of Defendant's statements that Gabriel "does not fit in our family because he is brown" 
and that Gabriel would fit into a trailer park "full of spicks" while "the rest of us would not." 
Transcript, at 43-45. 
The feelings of the Defendant toward Gabriel in the weeks before January 18, 2013, the 
day Gabriel was injured, are relevant to proving who injured Gabriel. Because the Defendant 
viewed Gabriel as "the other.,-a stranger or in1erloper in the family Defendant wanted to have 
with Loveridge-Defendant was less likely to exercise restraint in caring for Gabriel. 
Finally, the probative value of these statements is high. As explained, the statements 
demonstrate a deep-seated view that Gabriel did not belong in the family. Defendant made the 
statements in Loveridge's presence and she therefore has personal knowledge of them. The 
statements are made in the weeks immediately preceding the day Gabriel was injured. The 
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State's need for the evidence is great. Gabriel was injured at a time when he was in the sole care 
of Defendant. Alternative proof of Defendant's state of mind in regard to Gabriel is limited. It is 
unlikely that these statements will rouse the jury to ovennastering hostility, because, like Lucero, 
they are tame in comparison to the alleged abuse. The statements are not offered to prove that 
Defendant is a racist-that he hates all Hispanics-but rather to demonstrate that Gabriel was the 
person upon whom Defendant's contempt rested. A limiting instruction, ifrequested by the 
defense, would be effective in mitigating any improper use of the evidence. 
For these reasons, the Court grants the State's motion to admit this evidence. 
Flipping Off Gabriel 
Five days before Gabriel was injured, the Defendant-in the course of a heated argument 
with Loveridge-angrily "flipped off' Gabriel with both hands. 
This prior bad act is offered for a proper non-character purpose-to show that the 
Defendant had contempt for Gabriel. The Defendant's state of mind in relation to Gabriel is 
relevant. However the probative value of this evidence is thin. Flipping someone off-while an 
aggressive gesture-does not manifest an intent to kill or to do serious bodily injury. Moreover, 
this appears to have been a one-time event, and the strength of the evidence is lacking. 
Loveridge testified that she saw Defendant do this through a reflection in a fish tank. Other 
evidence will effectively demonstrate how Defendant perceived Gabriel. The risk of unfair 
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prejudice is high. The improper character purpose-to show that Defendant is an impatient 
father or crude person-predominates. 
For these reasons, the Court denies the State's motion in limine to admit this evidence. 
Jealousy of Gabriel 
Initially, the Court ruled that Defendant's "feeling of jealousy" is not a prior bad act 
subject to Rule 404(b). While this is true, the conclusion that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel 
constitutes the lay opinion of Loveridge. 1 Lay opinion must be "rationally based on the 
witness's perception" and "helpful ... to detennining a fact in issue." URE 701(a)(b). 
Here, Loveridge testified that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel because Defendant (1) 
did not like Gabriel clinging to her; (2) encouraged her to leave the room and let Gabriel cry it 
out; (3) would pull Gabriel away from her; (4) encouraged Loveridge to get GabriePs father to 
take him for parent time; and (5) wanted to have time with just her and K.M. Transcript, at 51-
52. 
· 
1 Defendant's own statement, if any, that he was jealous of Gabriel is not subject to Ruic '10 I. Defendant has 
personal knowledge of his own state of mind. A feeling of jealousy is not a prior bad act. The Defendant's own 
description of his slate of mind toward Gabriel in the weeks preceding January 18, 2013 is relevant. The probative 
value of Defendant's jealousy is limited by the degree to which Defendant experienced this feeling'. The content of 
Defendant's •~ealousy statement" and the comex1 in which the statement was made will clearly affect the probative 
value oflhe statement. The Court lacks sufficient information to detcnninc whether the probative value of this 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
13 
While Loveridge's opinion is rationally based on the facts she observed, her opinion is 
not helpful to detennining a fact in issue. The jealousy she describes is not manifest in ways that 
would suggest a deep-seated envy that would motivate Defendant to commit a violent act against 
Gabriel. Therefore, Loveridge's opinion would not be helpful to the trier of fact. 
For this reason, the Court denies the Defendant's motion in limine to admit Loveridge's 
lay opinion that Defendant was jealous of Gabriel. 
Pltvsical Treatment of Gabriel 
There is now evidence in the record that Defendant (1) may have bruised Gabriel's 
cheeks when attempting to administer medicine to him; and (2) several times picked Gabriel up 
by the anns in a rough manner, carried him across the room, and dropped him on a bean bag 
chair. Transcript, at 35-36, 22. 
These acts are not being offered for a proper non-character purpose. At first glance, the 
evidence appears to fit into the "absence of mistake or accident" box-a proper non•character 
purpose under Rule 404(b). After all> Defendant has asserted that he accidently dropped Gabriel 
on the early afternoon of January 18, 2013. 
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However, a more careful analysis demonstrates the fallacy of this conclusion. The State 
does not contend that Gabriel was injured when Defendant intentionally dropped him.2 Indeed, it 
is the State's position that a fall from the height described by Defendant could not produce the 
injuries Gabriel sustained. Thus, evidence that Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel on prior 
occasions is not relevant and therefore inadmissible. 
There is evidence in the record on which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant 
bruised Gabriel's cheeks while administering medicine to him. URE l 04(b), However, there 
does not appear to be a proper non-character purpose for this evidence. Even if there was, the 
probative value of this evidence is substantially ourweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
The evidence that Defendant caused the bruising is circumstantial. There is little similarity 
between the mechanism of injury to Gabriel's cheeks and the mechanism of injury that caused 
Gabriel's brain damage, Finally, there is a high risk that the jury would conclude that because 
Defendant injured Gabriel on one occasion, he is more likely to have injured him on January 18. 
This is the very purpose forbidden under Rule 404(a) and it clearly predominates. 
For these reasons, the Court denies the state's motion in limine to admit evidence that 
Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel on prior occasions and injured Gabriel while 
administering medicine. 
l If this were the State's theory, the State might rebut Defendant's claim of mistake or accident 
by introducing other instances in which Defendant intentionally dropped Gabriel. 
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ORDER 
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the State's Second Motion to Admit 404(b) 
evidence in part, and DENIES it in part. 
This is the final order of the Court on this issue. No further action is necessary. 
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